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Abstract—Many interactions between network users rely on
trust, which is becoming particularly important given the security
breaches in the Internet today. These problems are further
exacerbated by the dynamics in wireless mobile networks. In this
paper we address the issue of trust advisory and establishment in
mobile networks, with application to ad hoc networks, including
DTNs. We utilize encounters in mobile societies in novel ways,
noticing that mobility provides opportunities to build proximity,
location and similarity based trust. Four new trust advisor
filters are introduced - including encounter frequency, duration,
behavior vectors and behavior matrices - and evaluated over
an extensive set of real-world traces collected from a major
university. Two sets of statistical analyses are performed; the
first examines the underlying encounter relationships in mobile
societies, and the second evaluates DTN routing in mobile peer-
to-peer networks using trust and selfishness models. We find that
for the analyzed trace, trust filters are stable in terms of growth
with time (3 filters have close to 90% overlap of users over a
period of 9 weeks) and the results produced by different filters
are noticeably different. In our analysis for trust and selfishness
model, our trust filters largely undo the effect of selfishness on
the unreachability in a network. Thus improving the connectivity
in a network with selfish nodes.
We hope that our initial promising results open the door for
further research on proximity-based trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most interactions between people take into consideration,
and in many cases rely on, prior established trust. In the con-
text of interactions over computer networks trust establishment
is particularly important and challenging, given the identity
theft, fraud and security breaches common in the Internet to-
day. These problems are further exacerbated by the uncertainty
and dynamics in wireless mobile networks. Furthermore, in
infrastructure-less peer-to-peer mobile networks, such as ad
hoc, delay tolerant (DTNs) or sensor networks, cooperation,
and subsequently trust is imperative to the construction and
operation of the network. Without cooperation and trust these
networks would fail. With trust, several potential applications
can be enabled including mobile social networking, build-
ing groups and communities of interest, localized alert and
emergency notification, context-aware and similarity-based
networking [1], to name a few.
This study addresses the issue of trust advisory and
establishment in mobile networks, with application to
infrastructure-less wireless ad hoc networks, including DTNs.
We utilize encounters in mobile societies in novel ways, notic-
ing that mobility provides opportunities to build proximity,
location and similarity based trust. Each mobile device running
our trust application shall keep simple history of other devices
encountered (e.g., using existing neighbor discovery) and (if
applicable) the location of the encounters (e.g., using GPS
or access point association history). Four new so-called trust
advisory filters are introduced to analyze the encounter and
location history, including: 1. encounter frequency (FE) based
filter, 2. encounter duration (DE) based filter, 3. encounter
location based behavior-vector (BV ) filter based on - Count
and Duration, and 4. location preference based behavior-
matrix (BM ) filter. Each trust advisory filter provides a score
reflecting the level of trust identified by our system, to aid
the users in identifying potential trustworthy nodes in the
network. The filters calculations are done in a fully distributed
fashion that obviates the need for any server or trusted
third party. Ultimately, an application with these filters shall
provide the user with an option to choose trustworthy nodes
in coordination with personal preferences, location priorities,
contextual information, or encounter-based keys, as explained
in Section V.
The trust advisory filters are analyzed and evaluated over
an extensive set of real-world traces collected from a major
university, including over 35,000 users and spanning 12 weeks.
Two sets of statistical analyses are performed. The first ex-
amines the underlying encounter relationships in mobile soci-
eties, including distribution of encounter frequency, duration,
similarity scores based on location vectors and matrices, and
the differences (and similarities) between the various proposed
filters. The second evaluates DTN routing in mobile peer-
to-peer networks using trust and selfishness models, where
epidemic routing is used to analyze the characteristics of the
dynamic encounter graph.
We find that for the analyzed trace, three filters (DE,
FE, and BV -Count) create trust lists that remain consistent
(with 90% overlap) for more than 9 weeks. Thus the results
from these filters are stable. Initially, all the filters were
expected to produce similar results in terms of recommended
trusted nodes, but the results showed noticeable differences
in the selection. Surprisingly, despite these differences the
overall performance of epidemic routing based on the different
filters (or even random selection) were found to be similar.
This suggests that our methods for trust advisory can indeed
provide the users with trust options without the sacrifice
of performance in the context of DTNs. We note from the
trust and selfishness modeling that having trusted nodes as
recommended by the trust filters largely eliminates the effect of
selfishness in the network. The use of trust filters decreases the
unreachability in the selfish network (from 0.146 at selfishness
probability (S)=0.8 and trust (T )=40% to 0.122 using FE
filter when 0.109 is the unreachability in network with no
selfishness).
To sum, the main contributions of this paper include:
1- The proposal of a trust advisory framework that uti-
lizes mobile encounter characteristics, evolution and locations,
2- The introduction of four specific trust advisory filters
based on encounter frequency, spatio-temporal statistics and
similarity scores. The filters were evaluated using extensive
mobile network traces from a university campus, compared
and contrasted. 3- Performance of epidemic routing, in the
context of DTN, was analyzed for the various trust advisory
filters in conjunction with selfishness models. It was found
that our trust advisors can indeed be utilized in DTN without
adversely affecting the network performance.
We note that our framework of establishing trust incre-
mentally over a time window can be extended to include
encounter-based keys [2], [3], using out of band exchange
and to scenarios where trust evolves - strengthens or dissolves
- over time. The studies conducted here focus on trust es-
tablishment to aid network connectivity and interaction, after
which incentive [4], [5] and reputation [6] systems may be
used to police, monitor and reward transfers. Our work is thus
complimentary to, and can be integrated with, related work
in these areas. Our future work shall investigate this direction
further, in addition to analyzing other real-world traces from
other contexts, and implementing, deploying and monitoring
the trust advisory application in a test-bed.
Following is an outline for the rest of this document,
Section II discusses related work. Section IV provides overall
motivation for using encounters. Section V introduces the
trust advisory filters. Section VI provides the analysis of
the filters using mobile network traces. Section VII analyzes
performance of epidemic routing using trust and selfishness.
Section VIII provides future work, applications and conclu-
sion.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss some of the recent work being
done to establish trust and cooperation in the delay tolerant
networks, which is a critical aspect in networks to com-
municate and deliver information. Several researchers have
proposed novel approaches to establish trust and cooperation
in mobile ad hoc and delay tolerant networks using credit and
reputation based schemes, incentive and trust based schemes,
game theory and efficient routing based algorithms.
The reputation based scheme targets better peer selection
based on previous interactions records and transfer, thus pro-
viding trust ratings and cooperation to nodes in a mobile ad-
hoc network. In [6] a node detects misbehavior locally by
observation and use of second-hand information, in [7] pro-
pose a fully distributed reputation system that can cope with
false disseminated information where each node maintains
a reputation rating and a trust rating about other nodes. In
[8], [9], [10] analysis of rewards provisions and punishment
is conducted based game theoretic approaches to provide
incentives for message delivery. In [11], authors derived per-
formance and optimization statistics to measures the success in
delivery probability for a message covering both cooperative
and non cooperative scenarios. The study in [12] analyzed
the effect of cooperation on three different routing algorithms.
The authors investigated the performance of epidemic, two-
hop relaying and binary spray and wait routing to model a
node’s cooperation probability to either drop a message or to
forward the message to next hop level. However, these works
focus mainly on limited size topology implementation, for
only in particular scenarios. The routing and message delivery
work do not address social trust development and cooperation
in DTNs, which we focus on in this study based on historical
events and incremental build-up of social parameters based on
node encounters.
The incentive based credit schemes rank the trust on neigh-
boring nodes, in [13], authors proposed a game-theoretic
model to discourage selfish behavior and stimulates the co-
operation by leveraging Nash equilibria with socially optimal
behavior, while in [4], authors proposed a pricing mechanism
to give credits to the nodes who participate in message
forwarding mechanism. However, in these, the cooperation is
developed based on the number of messages transfered rather
than socially acceptable criteria of encounter analysis.
Message delivery mechanisms in DTN require node collabo-
ration. However, in real deployment some nodes may refuse to
cooperate. Such selfish nodes (or free riders) [14] could exploit
the services by receiving the messages from other nodes but
refusing to deliver it to next hop level. An analytical model
that builds the concept of trust is discussed in [15], [16]. The
authors show trust supports cooperation and is heavily based
on the interactions and bonds that govern behavior in ad hoc
and opportunistic scenarios.
Other approaches discussed in [17], [2], [18] propose ex-
plicit authentication mechanism to generate trust and coopera-
tion in network. These approaches are better modeled for small
group deployments [17] and requires to exchange public keys
and the installation of the private key on the users device [2].
They do not address some of issues of selfish nodes, scalability
and overhead incurred due to the key exchange and global
optimization.
III. TRACES USED
For the purpose of this study we have used 3 month long
(Sep to Nov 2007) Wireless LAN (WLAN) traces coming
from University of Florida, Gainesville. More than 35,000
users who accessed the WLAN during this period have been
considered in the study. Total number of Access Points is over
730. The information provided in the traces is anonymized.
Tab. I shows a sample of the traces used in this work.
MAC Start Time Duration(sec) AP/Location
00:11:22:33:44:55 01 Jun 2008 21:00:51 GMT 3000secs CS buildingAP1
11:22:33:44:55:66 01 Jun 2008 21:01:30 GMT 10secs ECE buildingAP2
01:02:03:04:05:06 01 Jun 2008 22:11:00 GMT 200secs MSL buildingAP1
10:20:30:40:50:60 01 Jun 2008 22:15:30 GMT 600secs MACA buildingAP1
11:22:33:44:55:66 01 Jun 2008 22:23:10 GMT 180secs CS buildingAP3
TABLE I
SAMPLE WLAN TRACE
IV. ENCOUNTER/PROXIMITY BASED TRUST
The foremost purpose of this work is to encourage interac-
tions in the mobile societies and establish network connectivity
in the context of ad-hoc and DTN networks. Trust can be
the foundation of cooperation in networks in general and
particularly in the infrastructure-less networks. In our context
trust means that a user is: 1. Willing to interact through the
network with the trusted node, and 2. In the context of DTN,
ready to accept a message for the trusted user and genuinely
attempt to route it. To develop trust between a pair of users,
we leverage interactions between users based on proximity
(when the devices come within radio range) and encounter
information. Several properties of nodal encounter behavior
have been investigated in [19].
The primary reasons for choosing encounters and prox-
imity as measure to generate trust comes from the work
on Homophily [20]. The principle of Homophily states that
people with similar interest meet and interact often. Trusting
frequently encountered users would mean trusting people
similar to oneself (like work colleagues or classmates). This
trust can have social incentives too. The second reason for
choosing proximity/encounter for trust is that because the users
are within the radio range of each other (for Bluetooth it is
∼15m) they can exchange out-of-band information. This out-
of-band exchange can enable a user to know more about the
other user and can also be used to set-up cryptographically
strong secrets between them [2]. This feature of out-of-band
information exchange is not possible on wired networks (as
the two terminals may be geographically far apart) but can be
easily leveraged by mobile peer to peer wireless networks.
The challenge is to find methods that can successfully
discover potential similarities between the users. We refer to
these methods as Trust Advisors Filters. In the implementation,
a user would actually decide on which users to trust and the
filters would serve as an advisors. Thus users would have full
control over the selection of trusted users. These filters would
act as the recommendation system that recommends users who
are most similar to the user. In the next section we present a
rich set of filters that find users most similar to the user.
V. TRUST ADVISER FILTERS/METRICS
This section presents a set of filters that capture similarity
between two users. This similarity can be captured indirectly
by using encounters and measuring metrics such as frequency
of encounters, duration of encounters, etc. The similarity
can also be captured directly by comparing the behavior
profiles/preferences with another user such as by comparing
the time spend at different locations. Behavior-Matrix and
Behavior-Vector based approaches discussed below belong to
the class of filters that can directly measure similarity. Follow-
ing we introduce A. Frequency of Encounters, B. Duration
of Encounters, C. Behavior Vector, and D. Behavior Matrix
filters.
A. Frequency of Encounters (FE)
One of the basic filters to estimate similarity between a
user-pair is the number of times they encounter (An encounter
is defined as the event where a device is in radio range of
another device such that it can discover the other device’s
MAC address). The more they meet, the more similar (and
are more trustworthy) they are. On this basis, we design the
FE filter that counts the frequency of the encounters of the
user with all the other users. To get the trust list from FE
filter for a user, we sort all the encountered users by their
number of encounters and select top users based on the trust
(T ) value.
The computational complexity of FE is O(N) and space
complexity is O(Nu) per device, where N is the number of
encounters and Nu is the number of unique users encountered.
B. Duration of Encounters (DE)
Another fundamental filter to estimate similarity is the
percentage of time spend by the user with another user. The
more the time spent together by the users, the more similar
they are (and are more trustworthy) likely to be. On this basis
we design the DE filter to keep count of the duration of time
spent by a user with all the other users. From the ordered list
of duration of encounters for the user, DE filter selects top
trusted users based on the T value.
The computational and space complexities for DE are
similar to those of FE, computation complexity of O(N) and
space complexity of O(Nu) per device.
C. Behavior Vector (BV)
An important characteristic of homophily is that simi-
lar people tend to go to similar locations. To capture this
characteristic, we have designed a filter that stores location
preferences of a user in a single dimensional vector. Each
user maintains a single vector for oneself. The columns of
the vectors represent the different location visited by a user
and the values stored in each cell indicate either duration
(BV −D) or count (BV −C) of the sessions at that particular
location, depending on the type of BV used. To get similarity
score between two users, they exchange the normalized BVs
and compute the inner product of the two normalized BVs.
The result of the inner product gives a score indicating the
similarity between the two users. This score is higher if the
two BV are similar and can be zero if the users do not have
single visited location in common. Fig. 1 illustrates the design
of a Behavior Vector.
The space complexity of BV on each device is O(L+Nu),
where L is the number of unique locations visited by the
user and Nu is the number of unique users whose similarity
Fig. 1. Behavior Vector for a user
scores are stored on the device. The computation complexity
for computing similarity score for two BV of length L1 and
L2 is O(L1 + L2).
D. Behavioral Matrix (BM)
We notice that for BV we maintain two vectors for duration
and frequency to capture user behavior. A modification of
vector into a matrix allows us to maintain a single entity to
capture a spatio-temporal representation of user behavior. In
this behavior matrix each column denotes a location and each
row represents a single day (here the frequency is counted in
terms of days). The value stored at each cell is the fraction
of the on-line time spent by the user at a particular location
on a particular day as shown in Fig. 2. To get the similarity
score between two users, we compare the two matrices.
This similarity has been exploited by the set of Profile-Cast
protocols [1] and Behavior mining techniques [21].
To make the behavior similarity check efficient (in terms of
space and computation complexity), we use the eigen values
of the behavior matrix for exchange between the two users.
The eigenvalues are generated using SVD (Singular Value
Decomposition). SVD is applied to a behavior matrix M , such
that:
M = U · Σ · V T , (1)
where a set of eigen-behavior vectors, v1, v2, ..., vrank(M)
that summarize the important trends in the original matrix
M can be obtained from matrix V , with their corresponding
weights, wv1 , wv2 , ..., wvrank(V ) calculated from the eigen-
values in the matrix Σ. This set of vectors is referred to
as the behavioral profile of the particular user, denoted as
BP (M), as they summarize the important trends in user M ’s
behavioral pattern. The behavioral similarity metric between
two users’ association matrices A and B is defined based
on their behavioral profiles, vectors ai’s and bj’s and the
corresponding weights, as follows:
Sim(BP (A), BP (B)) =
rank(A)∑
i=1
rank(B)∑
j=1
waiwbj |ai · bj | (2)
which is essentially the weighted cosine inner product between
the two sets of eigen-behavior vectors.
The space complexity of BM filter is O(DL) per device,
where L is the number of locations visited and D is the number
of days included in the matrix. Computation complexity of
SVD is O(D2L+DL2).
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Fig. 2. Behavior Matrix for a user (from [1])
If we compare FE and DE filters with BV and BM ,
we find that BV and BM require information exchange
between two users to calculate similarity. Since a user has
to depend on information provided by another user, issues
of data authenticity and privacy become important along
with the additional costs incurred in communication for the
transfer of vectors and matrix. To maintain authenticity of the
data, several techniques have been proposed that use Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [22], [23], this module maintains the
integrity of the sensed data. To lower the communication costs
in BM , one can only send top 5 to 10 eigen values as it has
been shown these can capture 90% of the user behavior [1].
E. Random Trust (RT)
This filter as the name suggests selects T percent of
encountered users randomly and adds them to the trust list,
we use this filter for comparison purposes. Ideally, we would
never want to refer to the advise by this filter, but we have
kept it here to later study the impact of each filter with respect
to random selection.
We note that for each filter the user may also choose to have
a lower threshold for selecting users before they are considered
by the filters. For example, in FE filter the user may not want
to consider users who have less than 2 encounters. However,
due to lack of space we are not presenting the analysis using
thresholds.
VI. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST FILTERS
Trust adviser filters need information about previous en-
counters (history of encounters) to produce trust lists. In this
section we conduct statistical analysis to investigate trust list’s
stability with time, similarity between the trust list generated
by the filters, and encounter similarity. This analysis can give
us insight into the requirements and benefits of filters. For all
the following analysis we use the WLAN traces.
A. Encounter and Similarity Statistics
To use a filter, it is necessary to know if the filter is going
to give any results at all and would it be able to distinguish the
users for trust advising. In this section, we present evaluation
of the proposed filters.
1) FE: Fig. 3 illustrates encounters per user for the month
of Nov 2007. The figure shows that out of the total population,
3,000 users have more than 1,000 encounters each in a month
and more that 15,000 users (more than 2/3 of the population)
have over 100 encounters. This result shows that users have
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Fig. 3. Encounters per user in the month of Nov 2007 (ordered in terms of
Encounter Frequency)
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Fig. 4. Average Duration of Encounter per user in the month of Nov 2007
(ordered in terms of Duration of Encounter)
significant number of encounters and it justifies our use of FE
as a trust filter.
2) DE: Fig. 4 illustrates the average duration of encounters
for Nov 2007. We notice that average encounter duration for
more than 20,000 users is greater than 1,000 seconds. This
justifies the use of DE as a trust filter.
3) BV: Fig. 5 illustrates the similarity score between all
the pair of users who encountered at least once in the month
of Nov 2007. Large number of user pairs have low similarity
(close to zero), which may mean that most of the users are
not similar to each other and few user pairs have very high
similarity scores. Results for BV −C are similar to BV −D
(Fig. 5).
4) BM: BM similarity score like BV is close to zero for
most of the user pairs and is high for a very few user pairs.
This is illustrated in Fig. 6. This implies that BM scores would
be able to distinguish between the users.
B. Stability Analysis
How the trust list grows and evolves over time can provide
insight into the stability of the trust list. One can also decide
based on the stability how much history to have before one
gets suitable recommendations. For this analysis, we compare
the list of trusted nodes at various lengths of history with
trust (T ) value set at 40%. Fig. 7 shows the stability of the
various trust filters. We use 9 weeks long WLAN traces (Sep
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Fig. 5. Similarity score using Behavior Vector-Duration(BV −D) filter for
all the encountered pairs of users in Nov 2007
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Fig. 6. Similarity score using Behavior Matrix (BM ) filter for all the
encountered pairs of users in Nov 2007
to Nov 2007) for the analysis. Except for the BV −D metrics,
all the other metrics show high similarity with trusted list of
previous months. For DE, FE, and BV − C the similarity
between list for 1 week and 9 weeks is more than 89%. This
implies that nodes trusted by DE, FE, and BV − C using
1 week of history may still be trusted when considering 9
weeks of history with the probability greater than 89%. This
also implies that DE, FE, and BV −C produce stable lists.
This stability can be attributed to the fact that user encounters
patterns captured by these three filters are inherently stable.
BM filter shows high stability in terms of trust list when
the difference in history is less than 2 weeks (>80%) and the
stability goes down to 55% for the 1 week of history when
compared to 9 week of history.
For the BV − D filter, the similarity between any list is
around 40%. This implies that every week the list changes by
60%. This may point to a possibility that users go to same
places regularly (by stability in BV − C) but may spend
different amounts of time at the same place over the weeks.
This can cause BV −D filter to pick different users in different
length of behavior history.
Overall, we note that some filters (DE, FE, and BV −C)
stabilize in just one week of history. These filters can be a
good choice for recommendations when trust history is short
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B. Frequency of Encounter (FE)
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C. Behavior Vector using (BV − C)
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D. Behavior Vector using Duration (BV −D)
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E. Behavior Matrix (BM )
Fig. 7. Comparison of trust list belonging to different history for various filters at T=40% (note that the y-axis scale for DE, FE, and BV − C starts at
85% and for BV −D and BM the scale starts at 35%)
and the time interval between trust list generation can also be
long. For BV −D filter we would have to redo the trust list
every week as the stability is comparatively low.
C. Correlation Between filters
It is important to study the differences between the trust list
obtained from different filters over different length of traces
(history). A smaller number of differences between a pair of
filters would mean a stronger correlation between them and
depending on the value it may make one filter redundant. On
the other hand a large difference points to the orthogonality
in the selection of users made by the filters. Fig. 8 plots the
results of comparing DE, FE, BV −C, BV −D, and BM
filters. For these results, we have set trust at T = 40%. The
results show comparison of top T = 40% users given by the
filters.
Fig. 8 also presents the effect of history of each filter on
every other filter. For example, in FE vs DE curve, we
compare lists produced by FE filter using history of 1 to
9 weeks with the DE filter. We observe that BV − C and
BV −D have the maximum similarity (>65%) and minimum
similarity between the users is seen in the comparison of
BV − D (or BV − C) with BM . We also notice that with
time similarity between FE (or DE) and BM increases.
If two filters recommend different sets of trustworthy users,
the user can be recommended with a richer set of users to trust.
If in future, we use a self-learning recommendation system,
based on previous selection of users, it can choose the filter
that matches closely to the users choices. Similarly, if two
filters present similar set of users, depending upon the space
and memory requirements one of the filters may be removed.
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VII. EFFECT OF TRUST AND SELFISHNESS
In the previous sections we saw how trust can be developed
in an infrastructure-less p2p network. In this section, we
induce trust (using the filters) into a network with selfish nodes
and analyze the effect on connectivity of the graph. The aim
of this exercise is to study how trust can overcome disruption
in connectivity of a network due to selfishness.
For this analysis we use Epidemic routing [24]. Epidemic
routing floods messages in time and space. The sender for-
wards a copy of the message to every encountered node that
did not already receive the message. All these encountered
nodes in turn forward a copy of the message to all the
encountered nodes that did not already receive the message
and so on. Epidemic routing maximizes the message delivery
rate and minimizes the message delay. Epidemic routing in
sense of message delivery success and message delay provides
an upper bound on performance, i.e., no other routing protocol
can provide better delivery rate or lesser delivery delay.
This property allows us to use epidemic routing as a tool
or benchmark to measure the dynamic connectivity of the
encounter graphs with varying trust and selfishness.
Before coupling trust and selfishness, we look at the effects
on the dynamic encounter graphs by the selfishness of the
network nodes only. This analysis allows us to appreciate the
effect of trust in the later part of this section. But before that
we present the setup of our trace driven simulation.
A. Trace-driven Simulation Setup
For the simulation, we have used WLAN traces belonging
to Sep, Oct, and Nov 2007. The epidemic routing is simulated
only on the traces belonging to Nov 2007. Sep and Oct 2007
traces are used to develop the history database for various
trust filters. The total number of users in Nov 2007 traces are
26,198. For epidemic routing, we have randomly selected 873
node as the sources (3.33% of the total nodes) and all 26,198
nodes act as receivers.
For analyzing each instance of the simulation, performance
of epidemic routing is measured in terms of Unreachability,
Delay and Overhead. We define Unreachability as the number
of nodes out of all receivers (for Nov 2007 there are 26,198
receivers) that could not be reached by a given source. Delay
is defined as the ratio of average time taken by a message to
reach all the possible receivers over the max delay possible (for
Nov 2007 it is 30 days). Overhead is defined as the average
number of hops a message took to reach all the possible
receivers using the shortest path. In all the graphs, we have
sorted the sources in the ascending order of the measured
quantity.
B. Selfishness
In infrastructure-less networks, without any incentive to
route messages, nodes may become selfish and refuse to
accept/route messages. Since an infrastructure-less network
fundamentally depends on the participation of network nodes
in routing and message transfers, selfishness can break down
the connectivity in the network.
To model the effect of selfishness on the connectivity of
the network, we test the performance of epidemic routing
when the network has selfish nodes. We define selfishness of a
node as a probability (S) with which the node will not accept
packet/message from another node for forwarding (assuming
that if a node accepts packet for routing it would sincerely
route it). For example if S = 0.9, then a node would not
accept packets from 9 out of 10 nodes in the network. Using
this probability (S) in the simulation of epidemic routing, with
uniform random distribution, we decide the nodes to which a
particular node is selfish to. (We have not considered misbe-
havior of the nodes but there are several techniques available
to detect misbehaving nodes [15], [25]. These techniques can
be combined with our work.)
Fig. 9 shows the effect of selfishness with varying S on the
performance of epidemic routing in terms of unreachability,
delay and overhead (hops per path). Looking at unreachability,
we observe that it increases non-linearly with increase in S
values. The average unreachability from S = 0 to S = .97
increases 4 times (1.6 times at S = 0.8). Understanding
delay requires us to understand how delay is calculated. Delay
is only calculated for nodes that were reachable. So as the
S increases, less number of nodes are reachable and only
these nodes are considered for delay calculations. Therefore
we notice that delay decreases as S increases because the
reachability is decreasing. This is evident by the observation
that as S increases, increasing number of sources (12% at
S = 0.97) report zero delay, indicating zero or very small
reachability. Overhead measurement also reports overhead for
the nodes that are reachable. We can see that with increase in
S the overhead increases as the messages have to take more
hops to reach a receiver. As the case with delay, in overhead
too the increase in S increases the number of sources which
have very low hop count (mostly zero). This low count again
points that several of sources (12% at S = 0.97) are unable
to transfer messages to any receiver with increase in S.
The results show that selfishness in a network severely im-
pacts the connectivity in the graphs. The increase in selfishness
increases the network partitioning. More than 12% of the users
may not be able to transfer message to any user if S > .97
and unreachabilty increases 4 times.
C. Effect of Trust
Selfishness adversely impact connectivity in an encounter
graph. To offset the impact, we propose the use of trust
built upon interactions and similarity between the users. This
section presents the impact of using trust on the connectivity
in the encounter graph. We again use the epidemic routing as
the tool for evaluation of network connectivity.
Trust between a pair of user is generated using the trust
filters developed in Sec. V. The filters select users based on
homophily and interaction. To derive trusted users for the
experiment we select top T percent users based on the filters
(For example, if T = 40% and we are using FE filter for
a user A, then we would order all the users based on the
number of encounters with A in decreasing order and select
40% of those from the top as trusted users). In a practical
implementation, users would have individual control on how
many and which users to trust, but for the simulation, we
assume that higher similarity (via trust filter) means greater
homophily and thus greater trust between them.
Once a user is considered trusted by a node, the node would
accept all packets from this user and attempt to route them,
regardless of the selfishness (S). This condition is analogous
to the fact that a user in real life may not be selfish to a person
he/she knows as opposed to a stranger. Fig. 10 shows the flow
chart that a user’s device may use before accepting and routing
packets from another user. Here, an incoming message is
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Fig. 9. Unreachability, Delay and Overhead at several S and T=0%, during trace period of Nov 2007
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Fig. 10. Flow chart for making routing decisions
processed by the Trust Generator Engine. This engine checks if
the message is from a trusted node (information given by trust
filters) and accepts the message if the node is trusted otherwise
it is sent to the Selfish Filter. This selfishness filter stores user-
specified selfishness probability and with this probability it
decides whether to accept the message or reject it.
The trust lists are updated once a week, this can be
justified (and is also realistic) as calculation of filter list after
every encounter or even every day may occupy computational
resources of the devices especially since many of the filters
are stable. The comparison and stability with time is presented
in previous section. For the simulation, filters bootstrap with
two months of history and the trust lists are updated weekly.
Fig. 11 shows the effect of trust on the performance (thus
connectivity) when nodes are selfish. The trust value is fixed
to T = 40% and S = 0.8. (We have performed several
experiments like varying trust and history on all the filters,
but due to lack of space we are presenting limited set of
results.) We observe that the presence of trust improves the
performance of the network. The average unreachability goes
down from 0.146 to 0.122 (from S = 0.8 and T = 0%
to S = 0.8 and T = 40% (FE)), where as the average
unreachability at S = 0.0 and T = 0% (no selfishness) is
0.109. The unreachability at S = 0.8 and T = 0% is 33%
more than the network with no selfishness, the trust reduces
this unreachability to 11% more than the network with no
selfishness. We observe that RT filter performs marginally
better in terms of improvements in the reachability. This may
be because RT selects users randomly which may be providing
shortcuts in the encounter graph. All the filters show similar
performance for unreachability.
The Delay graph (Fig. 11B.) shows that the delay decreases
with selfishness, this is because the connectivity goes down
with selfishness and thus the time taken to reach the reach-
able nodes also decreases. So delay may not give correct
information, but we can argue that adding trust is moving
the delay towards the scenario where the network has no
selfishness. The Overhead graph (Fig. 11C.) shows trends
similar to unreachability.
All the filters provide similar performance. Tab. II provides
average of unreachability, delay and overhead for all the filters.
FE filter performs the best (apart from RT filter). However,
both BV − C and BV −D perform slightly inferior to DE
and FE.
Filter Unreachability Delay Overhead
S=0.0 & T=0% 0.108998 0.707754 14.2889
S=0.8 & T=0% 0.145975 0.688934 15.4238
DE 0.125623 0.695938 14.9732
FE 0.121892 0.697582 14.8221
BV-D 0.125686 0.695215 15.1567
BV-C 0.125686 0.695215 15.1567
BM 0.12458 0.696189 15.0937
RT 0.119043 0.699930 14.8389
TABLE II
AVERAGE UNREACHABILITY, DELAY AND OVERHEAD USING VARIOUS
FILTERS (S=0.8 & T=40%)
D. Trust and Selfishness
To understand the effect of selfishness and trust on each
other, Fig. 12 shows average unreachability, delay and over-
head at multiple S and T values using DE filter (other
filters give similar results). We observe that increase in trust
(T ) reduces unreachability, delay and overhead regardless
of selfishness (S). The effect of trust is higher when the
selfishness in the network is high (the gradient of S = 0.9 is
maximum between any two values of trust). This is a critical
result since the utility of trust increases with the increase in
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Fig. 11. Unreachability, Delay and Overhead for all filters at S=0.8 and T=40%
selfishness of the network. The more is the selfishness, the
more is the value derived from trust. Similarly, we notice that
for S = 0.1 to 0.4 (a low value of selfishness) where increase
in trust does not affect the connectivity in the network in a
major way. So, trust is useful mainly in the networks with high
selfishness (S > 0.4). We also notice that maximum change
happens in unreachability, delay and overhead at T = 20%
from T = 0%. For this reason we have selected S = 0.8 in
the previous experiment as it serves as a middle ground.
In this section we observed how selfishness can affect the
connectivity in the encounter graphs. We also observed that
using the trust list created by the trust advisor filters the effects
of selfishness can be reduced.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we discuss novel methods that can convert
social interactions and similarities into trust for cooperation
in mobile adhoc and DTN. We propose several trust advisor
filters that can measure similarity between two users. We
perform statistical studies to capture the properties of the
filters. We find that several filters produce trust list that
are stable for more than 2 months. We note that results of
different filters are noticeably different and thus are capable
of providing a rich selection to the user. Our paper also
examines effects on network connectivity due to selfishness
in the network using real WLAN traces. Selfishness adversely
affects the reachability and partitions the connectivity graph.
Unreachability increases by 150% as the selfishness reaches
S = 0.8. We also analyze the effects of having trusted nodes in
a selfish network. We note that having trusted nodes increases
the connectivity and thus the reachability in the network with
selfish nodes. At trust of T = 40% in a selfish network
(S = 0.8) the unreachability remains at 120% of the levels of a
network with no selfishness. We note that in a selfish network
if the nodes trust the nodes that are similar to themselves, the
effect of selfishness in the network can be drastically reduced.
A major application of this work is to serve as a guide to
applications running on a mobile devices in making routing
and forwarding decisions, where presence of a node in the
trusted list can increases the chances of message delivery.
In the future, we plan to work on analyzing other trust filters.
We would also like to implement a scoring/weight system
that can combine together the scores of all the filter for a
encountered user. This score system would allow a user to
consider single score before adding another user to the trust
list. We would also like to design protocols that utilize the
filters and implement these filters on a mobile device.
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